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THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL FAITH 
JACK M. BALKIN∗
I.  A RISING OR A SETTING SUN? 
 
The original title of Constitutional Redemption1—which my pub-
lisher prevailed on me not to use—was “Agreements with Hell.”  The 
phrase comes from a famous statement of the abolitionist William 
Lloyd Garrison—himself drawing on the words of the prophet 
Isaiah—that the United States Constitution was “a covenant with 
death, and an agreement with hell.”2  By agreeing to protect slavery, 
the Framers had embedded evil in the constitutional system, and Gar-
rison believed that the only remedy for this original sin of constitutio-
nalism was to dissolve the Union, and for the North to secede from 
the South.3
Much of Constitutional Redemption is a meditation on Garrison’s 
famous argument.  It is true enough that slavery is gone.  But the 
Constitution-in-practice still has elements that maintain, preserve, or 
actively promote injustices.  As soon as we begin to identify these ele-
ments, of course, we will begin to disagree about what they are and 
how serious the injustices really are.  But that was true of the days of 
slavery, an institution that everyone now agrees was deeply unjust.  
And that is why the example of slavery is so useful in the present.  We 
rarely if ever face a system in which everyone is agreed that serious in-
justices are serious and unjust.  Rather, no matter how great the evils 
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 1. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].  
 2. Id. at 5 (citing WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. 
LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963)).  The origin of Garrison's famous phrase is Isaiah 28:18 
(King James): “[Y]our covenant with death shall be disannulled, and your agreement with 
hell shall not stand.” 
 3. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 5. 
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of social life, various people—including often quite powerful 
people—always have reasons to defend these aspects of social life, to 
argue that they are not so unjust or serious, to maintain that attempt-
ing to remedy them would cause even greater harms, and so on.  In-
justice does not appear naked before us; it is always cloaked in ratio-
nalizations and defenses, shrouded in controversies and disagree-
ments.  That is why it is so difficult to gain agreement on what is just 
and unjust. 
But suppose that we grant that the Constitution-in-practice, even 
today, maintains serious injustices.  Why should we maintain faith in 
the constitutional system?  Does it have sufficient resources to redeem 
itself over time?  Even if it does, why must we wait so long to achieve 
significant progress?  And if it really is a covenant with death and an 
agreement with hell, why should we continue to invest political efforts 
in the Constitution?  Why should we put ourselves on its side and at-
tempt to redeem it in history?  Perhaps the obstacles, or the cost, are 
just too great. Perhaps we should just start over. 
Constitutions are imperfect things, made by imperfect people in 
moments of conflict and compromise, and as they are built out the 
conflicts and compromises continue.  So we always begin constitu-
tional politics in the midst of an agreement with hell.  Yet this is not 
where we are always fated to end up.  The message of Constitutional 
Redemption is that the American Constitution, and its associated insti-
tutions, traditions, readings, and practices, are not incorrigible; and 
that there is always the possibility—although not the certainty—of po-
litical redemption. 
The Constitution was not finished at the time of its adoption.  It 
was and always is a work in progress. That is both a symptom of its im-
perfections and a source of its potential improvement.  The Constitu-
tion asserts its legitimacy, but for the constitutional project as a whole 
to be legitimate, people must believe that it is sufficiently worthy of 
their respect to justify the State’s coercion of themselves and others.  
And because for many people it is not currently worthy of respect, 
people must have faith that, despite its current imperfections, it can 
become so over time. 
For many people, the problem of constitutional faith does not 
even arise.  Many people may be reasonably comfortable with the sta-
tus quo; still others, whether out of patriotism, inertia, or both, may 
believe that the system is just fine as it is.  For such people, constitu-
tional faith is not particularly difficult; indeed, it may not be all that 
important.  But for people who find themselves as dissenters, who see 
serious injustices, and who worry that the country is careening out of 
 1146 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1144 
control, constitutional faith is quite important.  For these people, the 
Constitution-in-practice is not worthy of their veneration and respect.  
Fidelity to the constitutional project—and to the Constitution itself—
therefore requires faith in the eventual redemption of the Constitu-
tion.  Constitutional redemption is not guaranteed, and even when it 
arrives, it is never complete, it is never perfect, and it is never entirely 
innocent.  Yet the possibility of constitutional redemption underwrites 
faith in the current system, especially for constitutional dissenters.  
With such faith, our agreement with hell might yet become a charter 
of redemption; without such faith, it remains a covenant with death. 
Harvard University Press objected to calling the book “Agree-
ments With Hell.”  One reason they objected was that they thought 
the title was too reminiscent of Samantha Power’s best selling, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell,4  although of course Garri-
son’s phrase had been well known for a century and a half.  The 
second reason was that they thought that a book entitled “Agreements 
with Hell” was a downer, and wouldn’t sell (which, I admit, is in some 
tension with the first reason).  One can only imagine what they would 
have thought about Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.5
I still wanted to use the title “Agreements with Hell.” It was the 
original title of one of the chapters in the book, it was arresting, and it 
captured the ambivalent and complicated nature of constitutional 
faith.  Still, they demurred.  Could I think of something more uplift-
ing as a title?  “All right,” I said, “how about a book called Constitution-
al Faith?”  Then I thought, “Oh no, that one’s already been taken.”
 
6
The subtitle speaks of political faith, not constitutional faith, and 
the distinction is important.  One might well have faith in politics, but 
not faith in the Constitution, or, for that matter, politics that is con-
strained by the Constitution.  This is a central point of Aziz Rana’s 
contribution to this symposium.
  
Finally, I settled on Constitutional Redemption, and the word “faith” ap-
pears in the subtitle. 
7
Faith is not simply a calculation of costs and benefits discounted 
to the present.  It involves an attachment to the constitutional project; 
 
 
 4. SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
(2003).  
 5. Jonathan Edwards, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God, in SELECTED SERMONS OF 
JONATHAN EDWARDS 78–97 (H. Norman Gardiner ed., 1904).  
 6. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (rev. ed. 2011) (1988) [hereinafter 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH].  
 7. Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 MD. L. REV. 
1015 (2012). 
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that is why I say that it involves putting ourselves on the side of the 
Constitution.  Faith in the Constitution means supporting it, promot-
ing it, and trying to fulfill its promises in our own day.  Faith is a gam-
ble on something that may not come to pass.  Moreover, because the 
Constitution is fallen, and people are imperfect, progress under the 
Constitution may not occur; the day of redemption may never come. 
The uncertainty of faith is symbolized by the book’s cover, taken 
from a painting by Frederic Edwin Church, a member of the Hudson 
River School, whose artists were famous for their dramatic land-
scapes.8  Church himself was well known for his spirituality and his 
striking use of light.9
Actually, it doesn’t.  The point is that just from the four corners 
of the painting we cannot determine whether we are witnessing a su-
nrise or a sunset.  What looks like redemption could actually be de-
cline and descent into darkness.
  I suspect that many people think that the cover 
is optimistic, even romantic, in its hope for the future.  After all, 
doesn’t the painting show the light of a new day breaking through 
dark and stormy clouds? 
10
On the last day of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 
Benjamin Franklin made a similar point.  As the delegates were sign-
ing the draft Constitution, Franklin, looking at a picture of the sun on 
the horizon painted on the back of George Washington’s chair, re-
marked:  
 
I have . . . often in . . . the vicissitudes of my hopes and 
fears . . . looked at that [sun] behind the President without 
being able to tell whether it was rising or setting: But now at 
length I have the happiness to know that it is indeed a rising 
and not a setting Sun.11
Franklin’s speech is a statement of constitutional faith. The sun 
may be rising or setting on the American experiment in governance.  
We cannot be sure.  That is why faith is necessary.  For if we lack faith, 
our fears of political failure may turn out to be a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy, and the sun will turn out to be a setting sun. 
 
 
 8. See The Hudson River School, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http:// 
www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/hurs/hd_hurs.htm (last visited April 20, 2012). 
 9. William S. Talbot, American Visions of Wilderness, 56 THE BULLETIN OF THE 
CLEVELAND MUSEUM OF ART, 151, 159, 163 (1969). 
 10. Adrian Vermeule’s New Republic review noted the cover’s dual meaning.  Adrian 
Vermeule, Ideals and Idols, NEW REPUBLIC (June 8, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/book/review/constitutional-redemption-jack-balkin.  Vermeule’s 
work on the Constitution features the theme of uncertainty and the problem of second 
best, so he is particularly well-situated to understand the painting’s ambivalence. 
 11. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 1787, at 648 (1911). 
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In order not to keep you in suspense, the actual title of Church’s 
painting is “Twilight in the Wilderness.”  It is a picture of a sunset, not 
a sunrise, and it was composed in 1860, just before the Civil War, 
which some hoped (and others feared) would be the end of the Un-
ion.12
II.  SKEPTICISM ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 
  If we think that we are watching a sunrise, it is because we want 
it to be a sunrise, because we have optimism, or hope. 
Several of the contributors to this symposium ask whether we 
should have faith in the American constitutional system.  Aziz Rana, 
for example, points out that constitutional faith can be counterpro-
ductive: “[T]he commitment to constitutional continuity” in our his-
tory, he argues, “actually undermined—rather than facilitated—the 
possibility of a truly emancipatory and anti-colonial politics.”13 Ameri-
ca’s “failure to . . . embrace rupture and to break from constitutional 
faith played a critical role in sustaining practices of subordination.”14 
Rana concludes that, “depending on the circumstances, constitutio-
nalism may be just as likely to inhibit transformative change as to fos-
ter it.”15
Rana does not suggest that progressives should go out of their 
way to disobey the Constitution.  Instead, he argues, they should be 
pragmatic.  The discourse of constitutionalism may sometimes benefit 
progressive causes, but in other cases it will not.  Therefore, Rana ar-
gues that progressives, rather than committing themselves to working 
within the constitutional system, should decide in particular cases 
whether constitutionalism is the best way to achieve their goals.  
Sometimes, Rana believes, progressives should appeal to the constitu-
ent power of the people and adopt extra-legal methods—with the ca-
veat that these methods must always be broadly supported in society.
 
16
Sanford Levinson’s Constitutional Faith analogized fidelity to the 
Constitution to religious faith.
 
17
 
 12. Commentary on Twilight in the Wilderness, CLEVELAND MUSEUM OF ART, SPECIAL 
EXHIBITIONS, http://www.clevelandart.org/exhibcef/highlights/html/3910085.html.  
 But Levinson has long since given up 
his constitutional faith and has become a modern day Garrisonian.  
 13. Rana, supra note 7, at 1020. 
 14. Id. at 1019. 
 15. Id. at 1020. 
 16. Id. at 1047 (“[P]olitical discretion—if exercised on behalf of a broad constituency, 
one able to provide such practices with widespread popular legitimacy—has the potential 
to be both transformative and democratic.”). 
 17. See LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 6, at 9–17 (describing America’s 
veneration of the Constitution and Americans’ use of the Constitution “as the center of a 
genuine community of faith”).  
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He argues that hardwired rules and taken-for-granted practices that 
he calls the Constitution of Settlement are both dysfunctional and 
undemocratic.18
Faith—or rather, the loss of faith—is also at the center of Andrew 
Koppelman’s contribution.
  Therefore, Levinson argues, constitutional faith is 
counterproductive; we need a new constitutional convention. 
19  John Rawls’s principle of liberal legiti-
macy presupposed that all reasonable members of the political com-
munity could agree on a set of basic constitutional essentials and that 
a well-ordered society was one in which all reasonable persons could 
agree on the same basic conception of justice.20  Nevertheless, Kop-
pelman argues, if the portrait that Frank Michelman and I offer is 
correct, this is an illusion: our fellow citizens may have very different 
views of justice; very different notions of the constitutional essentials 
necessary to legitimacy; and therefore very different views of what the 
Constitution—construed in its best light—requires.21  If so, Koppel-
man asks, perhaps we might lose faith in the legitimacy of our consti-
tutional regime, for it cannot conform to Rawls’s criteria.  More to the 
point, perhaps we will lose faith in our fellow citizens, who may never 
have the common norms of justice that we naively assumed they 
shared with us, and who may never agree with us on the most impor-
tant questions of justice and constitutionalism.  Perhaps, Koppelman 
suggests, the liberal project of constitutionalism is fated to end in be-
trayal and heartbreak.22
H.W. Perry is even more pessimistic.  Political science, he argues, 
demonstrates the enormous obstacles to constitutional redemption in 
our day. Popular mobilizations will be unlikely to alter a deeply unjust 
status quo.
 
23
 
 18. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 3–9 
(2006)[hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION]; Sanford Levinson, 
How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956 (2012). 
  Perry is fully aware of the long history of redemptive 
mobilizations in American history: the Jeffersonian revolution, the 
Jacksonian transformation, Reconstruction’s new birth of freedom, 
the populist and progressive movements, the New Deal, the civil rights 
 19. Andrew Koppelman, Respect and Contempt in Constitutional Law, or, Is Jack Balkin 
Heartbreaking?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1126 (2012). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 1128.  
 22. Id. at 1142–43. 
 23. H.W. Perry, Jr., Constitutional Faith, Constitutional Redemption, and Political Science: 
Can Faith and Political Science Coexist?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1098, 1107 (2012) (noting “systemic 
and behavioral features that exist and are growing to thwart protestant constitutionalism in 
the American political system”). 
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revolution, the women's movement, the gay rights movement, and the 
transformation of American politics wrought by successive waves of 
conservative mobilization. Why don’t these examples give us hope 
that Americans can change their Constitution for the better? 
Perry has two responses. First, such examples, and others like 
them “seem to be more anecdotal than evidence of systematic and sys-
temic behavior.”24 They are stories of the past—sometimes a distant 
past—not analyses of the present.  They are exceptions to a general 
trend in a political system that is increasingly impervious to reform 
and unresponsive to popular mobilizations.  These “exceptions,” Per-
ry believes, “prove the rule” of ever increasing impediments to consti-
tutional transformation.25 “To a political scientist,” Perry argues, “the 
question is not can the system be politically responsive,” it is how res-
ponsive it is or how likely it is to be responsive.26
Perry’s second response follows from the first. Even if American 
history is full of examples of redemptive constitutionalism, the situa-
tion has changed.  Things are different now.  The trend is toward ever 
greater blockages to change.
 
27 Unlike the America of previous genera-
tions, today’s America features a disempowered public and constitu-
tionally unserious politicians in deeply polarized political parties. The 
Supreme Court enjoys enormous popular legitimacy and it has effec-
tively become the last word on all matters constitutional.28  These 
days, Perry believes, it is difficult if not impossible to develop new 
constitutional ideas that can successfully challenge the Supreme 
Court’s existing doctrines.  Americans defer too much to the Su-
preme Court’s view of what the Constitution means and they are una-
ble to effectively oppose it.29  “[T]he longer the ‘expert’ judgment of 
the Court stays in place and is not overturned,” Perry fears, “the more 
difficult it becomes not to see the Court’s position as what the Consti-
tution means.”30
 
 24. Id.  
  To all this, Perry adds the many institutional and po-
litical impediments to effective social transformation: 
 25. Id. at 1112 (arguing that robust constitutional debate and dissent will not lead to 
significant constitutional change over time and “[t]here are structural reasons to think the 
trend [of increasing impediments to political responsiveness] will continue”). 
 26. Id. at 1111. 
 27. Id. at 1112. 
 28. Id. at 1113–16 (describing impediments to effective politics), 1117–20 (noting the 
powerful institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court). 
 29. Id. 1119 (“Balkin . . . underestimates . . . how much deference there is to the exper-
tise of the Justices.”). 
 30. Id.  
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the Senate, the Electoral College, federalism, separation of 
powers, single member districts, [the amendment process 
of] Article V of the Constitution . . . political parties, the fili-
buster, the decline in competitive electoral districts, ex-
traordinary protection for incumbents, polarization, the 
seemingly unstoppable rise of presidential power, the ex-
traordinary role of money in politics, the extraordinary pro-
liferation of undigested information, segmentation of how 
citizens receive information that encourages people to have 
their own biases go unchallenged, [and] the decline in 
structures that encourage civic engagement.31
It is possible in theory, Perry argues, that “all of these things 
could be changed, but there are huge structural barriers to accom-
plishing this, and I would argue bolstered by much research in politi-
cal science, that change has become exceedingly more difficult.”
 
32
At first glance we might read Perry as putting his faith not in po-
litical redemption but political science, a science which, he believes, 
establishes the limits to possible political change in the United States. 
Repeatedly he invokes the authority of political science (going back to 
Aristotle) and his standing as a social scientist.
 
33 At one point, he even 
speaks of putting on his “political science vestments,”34
Nevertheless, despite its title, Perry’s article does not really estab-
lish that political science and political faith are opposed to each oth-
er.  Much of Living Originalism and Constitutional Redemption draw on 
political science literatures to explain how political parties and social 
movements interact with judicial review and alter constitutional 
meanings over time.
 thus portray-
ing himself as a priest in the church of social science. 
35  As Perry notes, “Balkin understands how the 
American political system works as well as any political scientist. . . . 
He does have some evidence and could find more to counter some of 
my claims.  It is just that he and I are reading the evidence and the tea 
leaves differently.”36
Thus, we have two scholars, looking at much of the same evi-
dence, who come to very different conclusions about whether the 
   
 
 31. Id. at 1122. 
 32. Id. at 1123. 
 33. See id. at 1107, 1109, 1113, 1121, 1123.  
 34. Id. at 1107. 
 35. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM chs. 13, 14 (2011) [hereinafter 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, chs. 
3, 5, 7. 
 36. Perry, supra note 23, at 1107. 
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American system can redeem itself over time.  One is pessimistic, the 
other is optimistic.  Far from a dispute between faith and science, this 
is a dispute about faith itself. 
In Constitutional Redemption, I argue that constitutional faith is 
usually organized around narrative.37
The difference between Perry’s account and mine is not primari-
ly a disagreement about empirical evidence.  I am as aware as he is of 
the thickening of our political institutions.  Indeed, to quote the title 
of a recent book by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, things 
are even worse than they look.
  We believe in the Constitution 
because we believe in a story about who we are, what we have done, 
where we came from, and where we are going.  Conversely, we lack 
faith in the constitutional system because of a different story we tell 
ourselves about who we are, what we have done, where we came from, 
and where we are going. 
38
Perry’s story, by contrast, is a story of a nation and a political sys-
tem in decline. Once upon a time we might have had the kind of 
country, the kind of institutions, and the kind of people that allowed 
real constitutional transformation.  But that is true no longer.  Our 
institutions have decayed, our people are docile or disengaged, our 
parties are irresponsible, and our Supreme Court is smug, imperial, 
and unresponsive.  And because political legitimacy is also often pre-
mised on a background narrative—a story about which direction the 
country is heading—Perry’s is also a story of the accelerating loss of 
legitimacy in American political institutions. 
  Rather, the differences between us 
depend on the story we tell to interpret this evidence.  I believe that 
our current circumstances are indeed daunting.  But history shows 
that America has often been in the grip of self-destructive politics, 
when political institutions were deeply corrupt, when selfish or short-
sighted elites held a stranglehold on politics, when ordinary people 
were demoralized, demobilized, or both, and when democracy ap-
peared finally to be losing its grip.  Those conditions were also dread-
ful, but they turned out not to be permanent.  This gives us at least 
some reason to think that our current situation is not permanent ei-
ther.  Things may get worse—every civilization that rises also falls at 
some point—but they can also get better. 
Perry’s account, although appearing in the guise of a social scien-
tific report, is actually an example of a familiar religious trope in 
 
 37. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 3. 
 38. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM (2012). 
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American history—a jeremiad, which decries the corruption of social 
and political institutions and the country’s inevitable decline and 
fall.39
But there are two versions of the jeremiad.  The first version is a 
portrait of desolation; a compendium of the many ways in which we 
have fallen and our institutions have decayed. It offers little hope of 
improvement; indeed, each time the list of failings is offered, it seems 
to grow longer. This is the European jeremiad, and it is closest to Per-
ry’s. In fact, H.W. Perry’s jeremiad is a bit like the well-known account 
offered by his namesake Perry Miller, who described the Puritan je-
remiad as an “uninhibited and unrelenting documentation of a 
people’s descent into corruption” that was unrivaled in the literature 
of the world.
 
40
The second version of the jeremiad, celebrated by Sacvan Berco-
vitch in his famous study, American Jeremiad, also emphasizes the terri-
ble straits in which Americans find themselves, but it always asserts 
faith in the possibility of ultimate redemption. Its characteristic fea-
ture is a demand for renewal and a call for action. In this version of 
the jeremiad, our circumstances are not simply punishment for our 
past wickedness; they present a challenge to be overcome, and an op-
portunity for self-correction and spiritual rebirth.
 
41 Faith in the Amer-
ican project, like faith in Providence itself, is necessary despite the 
odds, precisely because it enables us to imagine how we might over-
come our present condition. To succeed, Americans must not des-
pair; they must face their situation clearly and rededicate themselves 
to their most central values.42
 
 39. As a well-known social scientist of the 7th century B.C. put it: 
 Indeed, Bercovitch famously criticized 
Perry Miller’s account for failing to note that the distinctive feature of 
The ways of Zion do mourn, because none come to the solemn feasts: all her 
gates are desolate: her priests sigh, her virgins are afflicted, and she is in bitter-
ness. 
   Her adversaries are the chief, her enemies prosper; for the Lord hath afflicted 
her for the multitude of her transgressions: her children are gone into captivity 
before the enemy. 
Lamentations 1:4-5 (King James).  
 40. PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 8 (1956).  
 41. SACVAN BERCOVITCH, AMERICAN JEREMIAD 7 (1978) (contrasting the European je-
remiad, with its “lament over the ways of the world” and the sins of the people, with the 
American jeremiad, which featured a call for action and renewal). 
 42. Id. at xi (“The American jeremiad was a ritual designed to join social criticism to 
spiritual renewal, public to private identity, the shifting ‘signs of the times’ to certain tradi-
tional metaphors, themes, and symbols.”); see Timothy P. O’Neill, Constitutional Argument as 
Jeremiad, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 33, 40-41 (2010) (explaining that the American jeremiad was a 
ritualized process that sought to promote moral progress over time). 
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the American jeremiad was its “unshakeable optimism” and its “prom-
ise of ultimate success”43
It turns out, then, that both H.W. Perry’s account and my book—
which, after all, argues that the Constitution always exists in a fallen 
condition—are jeremiads. But they are jeremiads of different types. 
Perry’s story is one of impediments without hope; mine is a story of 
hope despite impediments. The difference between them is not that 
one is fundamentally scientific or religious while the other is not. Ra-
ther, the difference between them is the difference in the stories they 
tell to make sense of our current condition; it is the difference, in 
other words, between the jeremiad of desolation and the jeremiad of 
renewal.   
 The American jeremiad was not merely a de-
scription of events; it was a rhetorical strategy for thinking about time 
and history that offered Americans a way to imagine their redemp-
tion. 
At first glance, Lani Guinier’s and Gerald Torres’s contribution 
deliberately distances itself from the question of faith.  What we need 
right now, Guinier and Torres explain, is not constitutional faith; it is 
constitutional politics driven by the activism of ordinary citizens.44  
Similarly, what we need is not redemption; it is redistribution of re-
sources and opportunities to ordinary people.  “Belief alone,” they 
explain, “does not assure change.  We can all speak constitutional 
truth, but the only constitutional truth that matters is that which is 
backed by power.”45
Even so, questions of faith bubble up to the surface of their ar-
gument, and by its end, they offer a remarkable contrast to the darker 
visions of Andrew Koppelman and H.W. Perry.  As Guinier and Torres 
explain, what is important is not faith in the Constitution as an ab-
stract entity.  It is faith in the political power of ordinary people—the 
people who will talk back to institutions and the elites who run them, 
and the people who will force society to take account of their claims 
of justice and injustice.
 
46  “[F]aith in the Constitution,” Guinier and 
Torres maintain, “has to be faith in the possibility of citizen participa-
tion in an ongoing set of institutions.”47
 
 43. BERCOVITCH, AMERICAN JEREMIAD, supra note 
  “[I]t is faith in the capacity of 
41, at 7–8. This trope continued long 
after the founding of the United States. “In virtually every area of life,” Bercovitch ex-
plained, “the jeremiad became the official ritual form of continuing revolution.”  Id. at 
141. 
 44. Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We the 
People, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1069–70 (2012). 
 45. Id. at 1064. 
 46. Id. at 1065–66. 
 47. Id. at 1063.  
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political struggle to lead us to imagine and construct a future in which 
the liberatory ideals of our framework documents can be rooted that 
is most important.”48
Jamal Greene’s essay also does not appear to be about constitu-
tional faith, at least on the surface.  Rather, he is interested in why 
conservative originalists neglect the Fourteenth Amendment, and he 
argues that they do so because of the cultural narratives that under-
write their originalism.
 
49
As noted above, Constitutional Redemption argues that constitu-
tional faith is usually organized around narratives, in this case stories 
about the country, the Constitution, and the American people.
  But it turns out that the idea of faith is quite 
important to his anthropological account. 
50  
Greene’s anthropology of originalism builds on this point.  Original-
ists, he argues, believe in narratives of permanence, continuity, and 
restoration, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is redemptive in 
character, and open to the future, is ill-suited to this kind of story.51
Conservative originalists, Greene argues, seek authority from im-
agined heroic practices of the past; not from the fulfillment of a 
promise in the future.  The Fourteenth Amendment arises out of con-
stitutional failure; it points accusingly at a past world of injustice that 
can only be redeemed by transformation of the status quo.  It is not a 
vision of a return to better days but a marker of present deficiency 
and a symbol of future fulfillment.  It therefore sits awkwardly with 
what Greene calls the “cultural affinity” of conservatives.
 
52  To accept 
the Fourteenth Amendment fully, Greene contends, would severely 
test the constitutional faith of many conservatives, because that faith is 
based on permanence, constancy, and a return to past verities.  That 
is why he believes conservatives have so much difficulty embracing an 
amendment organized around narratives of constitutional redemp-
tion and transformation; instead they must selectively misremember 
the Fourteenth Amendment, or downplay its centrality to the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition.53
Greene somewhat overstates the case: many contemporary con-
servative originalists are quite interested in the history of the Four-
 
 
 48. Id. at 1066. 
 49. Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 980–83, 1014 
(2012). 
 50. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 3. 
 51. Greene, supra note 49, at 1002–03 (arguing that “the Fourteenth Amendment bet-
ter enables redemptive than restorative constitutional narrative”). 
 52. Id. at 1014. 
 53. Id. at 1008. 
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teenth Amendment, and their number is increasing.  Yet the reasons 
why conservative originalists have become interested in the Four-
teenth Amendment are actually consistent with Greene’s larger point. 
One obvious reason why conservative originalists might become 
more interested in the Fourteenth Amendment is that they can in-
creasingly deploy the Amendment and its history to promote conserv-
ative substantive agendas.  Supporters of gun rights can use the histo-
ry of the Fourteenth Amendment to show that the Reconstruction 
framers believed that an individual right to bear arms in self-defense 
was a fundamental right.54  Libertarian conservatives have been inter-
ested in the Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons.  First, one can 
use the history of the privileges or immunities clause and the 1866 
Civil Rights Act to justify increased protection for economic freedoms 
of property and contract.55
But there is a deeper reason why we should expect that conserva-
tive originalists generally—and not just conservative libertarians—will 
increasingly focus on the Fourteenth Amendment.  Conservative ori-
ginalists, like everyone else, face the task of showing that their pre-
ferred methodology can explain or justify central features of the exist-
ing constitutional regime.  That is because the democratic legitimacy 
of the Constitution depends not only on the initial act of adoption, 
but also on the continuing popular acceptance of the Constitution-in-
practice, which includes the New Deal and the civil rights revolution.  
Judges who forthrightly stated that they would not be bound by the 
regime’s basic commitments would undermine their claim to authori-
ty in the constitutional system.
  Second, libertarians generally support the 
application of the Bill of Rights—including particularly the Second 
Amendment—to the states.  Therefore the original understanding of 
the privileges or immunities clause is quite important. 
56  Recognizing this fact, liberals and liv-
ing constitutionalists have repeatedly tried to attack originalism on 
the ground that it cannot explain Brown v. Board of Education,57
 
 54. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1866–1876 (1998) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment clearly sought to protect the right of the freedmen to bear arms in self de-
fense and recognized the right to bear arms as a fundamental individual right); MICHAEL 
KENT CURTIS: NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 104 (1988) (“Among the rights that Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress re-
lied on as absolute rights of the citizens of the United States [was] the right to bear 
arms.”). 
 Loving 
 55. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 5 (2012); Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334 (2005). 
 56. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 35, at 114–15. 
 57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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v. Virginia,58 Griswold v. Connecticut,59 and contemporary guarantees of 
sex equality.60
Changes in the constitutional canon thus pose a continuing 
problem of legitimacy for conservative originalists.  Consistent with a 
narrative of permanence, conservative originalists generally talk as if 
the legal meaning of the Constitution is fixed at the time of adoption.  
Unfortunately, the constitutional commitments of the constitutional 
regime are not fixed, but continue to change—sometimes quite sig-
nificantly—over the years. 
  Moreover, as the commitments deemed important or 
fundamental to the regime change, so too do the list of cases or re-
sults that all “reasonable” legal professionals must accept as correct. 
Originalist judges and scholars who wish to be thought in the 
mainstream—as opposed to “off-the-wall”—must find ways to square 
their methodology with the central assumptions of an ever-changing 
constitutional regime.  One way to do this is by accepting an ever 
broader list of non-originalist precedents—as Justice Antonin Scalia 
does.  These precedents are admittedly inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion’s meaning, but we accept them nevertheless in the interests of 
stability.61
A far more promising solution for conservative originalists is to 
rework their understanding of originalism’s commitments and en-
tailments so that the current set of canonical cases were always cor-
rect.  Returning to the historical sources, contemporary originalists 
discover that earlier originalists were mistaken and that the regime’s 
commitments are—and always have been—consistent with the per-
manent meaning of the Constitution.  All that contemporary original-
ists need to do is take account of changed factual circumstances and 
assumptions by the adopting generation that have proved to be fac-
tually mistaken.
  But this strategy may be self-defeating in the long run.  As 
the number of non-originalist precedents grows, original meaning be-
comes increasingly irrelevant to most constitutional questions. 
62
 
 58. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 
 59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 60. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 12–19 (2010) (criticizing 
originalism because it cannot explain many deeply embedded principles of American con-
stitutional law). 
 61. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The whole function of the doctrine” of stare 
decisis “is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held 
true, all in the interests of stability.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 9, 11–12, 53 (2011) (arguing that sex equality is guaranteed by principles 
against caste legislation, but that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and adopters la-
bored under a series of factual misconceptions about the sexes).  Calabresi argues that fol-
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These changes in originalist conclusions, in turn, can be ex-
plained in terms of better tools and greater theoretical precision.  An 
earlier generation of originalists lacked the historical and methodo-
logical sophistication of later generations, who, happily, can correct 
the errors of their elders.  In particular, the need to square originalist 
methodology with the strongly egalitarian features of the current con-
stitutional regime inevitably leads originalists—particularly in the 
generations after Raul Berger, Robert Bork, Edwin Meese, and Anto-
nin Scalia—to take a fresh look at the Reconstruction-era Amend-
ments. 
Moreover, retooling originalism to justify modern egalitarian de-
cisions does not undermine conservative cultural affinities; if any-
thing, it reinforces them.  If originalists can show that Brown, Loving, 
Griswold, and the 1970s sex-equality decisions are consistent with orig-
inal meaning, then there is no need to see the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as fundamentally redemptive.  The Fourteenth Amendment does 
not require that we update the Constitution or make it more just over 
time through continuous constitutional construction.  Rather, these 
results were always implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s original 
meaning; therefore, enforcing these results is completely consistent 
with a narrative of permanence and restoration. 
In sum, Greene may be right that conservative originalists are 
troubled by narratives of redemption and prefer narratives of restora-
tion.63  But this suggests that conservative originalists will increasingly 
be drawn to investigate the Fourteenth Amendment as time goes on 
in order to preserve their constitutional faith.  Indeed, in Living Orig-
nalism I noted that it was only a matter of time before some very clever 
conservative originalist tried to show that the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects homosexuals as well as blacks and 
women.64
 
lowing ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, “sex discrimination became unconstitu-
tional as to all civil rights,” while Rickert argues that “Section One always could have been 
legitimately read to prohibit laws discriminating on the basis of sex.”  Id. at 68 n.321.  
  If gay rights ever become as taken for granted as racial and 
sexual equality, then conservative originalists will have to show why 
the Constitution’s original meaning, rightly understood, has always 
implicitly protected the rights of homosexuals (at least when one con-
trols for changes in factual context).  In such a constitutional regime, 
conservative originalists will have to work gay rights into narratives of 
constitutional permanence and restoration in order to preserve their 
 63. See Greene, supra note 49, at 999 (“[T]he more one focuses on redemption, the 
less one believes in originalism.”). 
 64. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 35, at 118. 
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constitutional faith.  And, if current trends continue, that day is not 
far off.65
III.  THE PREDICAMENTS OF POLITICAL FAITH: DISTRIBUTION, DREAD, 
AND IDOLATRY 
 
In Constitutional Redemption, I argue that when we say we have 
faith in the Constitution, we are not simply saying that we have faith 
in a particular text; we are also saying that we have faith in a people and 
in the development of the institutions of constitutional democracy 
through which popular will is expressed.66
This connection between faith in the American Constitution and 
faith in the American people is implicit in several of the contributors’ 
essays. Some contributors have lost faith in the public: Andrew Kop-
pelman fears that the people may let each other down, and H.W. Per-
ry believes that ordinary citizens are disaffected and powerless.  Other 
contributors retain faith in the people: Lani Guinier and Gerald 
Torres see the energy of ordinary citizens as the Constitution’s last 
best hope, while Aziz Rana places his faith not in the Constitution but 
in democratic extra-legal and extra-constitutional mobilizations at 
crucial points in history. 
  Therefore what is re-
deemed is not simply a set of promises in a document, but a trans-
generational constitutional project and a people. Behind a constitu-
tion are the people who live within its political framework.  Political 
faith is a bet not on particular words but on the members of a political 
community who chose to live—or not to live—by these words. 
Political faith turns out to be a very complex idea, and, as we 
shall now see, it is better to think of it not as a single entity but as a 
composite—a distribution of faith and lack of faith, an economy of 
hope and fear.  
A.  Political Faith as a Distribution or Economy 
Asking whether one has faith or should have faith is often quite 
misleading.  Rather, the real question is more likely to be the assign-
ment or distribution of faith across various people, institutions, and 
projects.  Imagine a sort of law of conservation of faith, analogous to 
 
 65. Steven Calabresi’s recent argument that the Fourteenth Amendment bans caste 
and class legislation generally, and prohibits all discrimination based on sex, might seem 
to suggest that states may not discriminate between same-sex and opposite-sex marriage, 
although he has not (yet) reached that conclusion. See generally Calabresi & Rickert, supra 
note 62. 
 66. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 1, at 8, 26. 
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the law of conservation of matter and energy.  Faith is not simply ex-
tinguished; rather, it shifts from one object to another.  This is not a 
perfect analogy, of course, because it is difficult to quantify the actual 
amount of faith one has, and so it would be hard to establish that this 
number never changes. 
Perhaps more correctly, we should say that faith is a distribution 
among various aspects of one’s world.  One’s faith—and one’s corres-
ponding lack of faith—is distributed over various people, institutions, 
and things.  One believes in A rather than B, one puts one’s trust in C 
and fears D.  Thus, even if one lacks faith in something or someone, it 
does not follow that one lacks faith entirely.  Rather, one puts one’s 
trust elsewhere.  Complete lack of faith in anything and everything is 
rare, because faith is necessary not only to ground and justify action, 
but also to situate us in our environment.  A person who did not be-
lieve in anything might not even be able to get out of bed in the 
morning.  Therefore whenever we are confronted with denials of faith 
in something or someone, it is important to probe further and ask 
where the speaker actually places his or her faith.  Often fervent de-
nials of faith in one thing are accompanied by equally strong belief in 
other things not present. 
A similar point applies to situations in which faith seems to be 
absent or irrelevant.  A change in circumstances or perspective may 
show us where one’s faith is placed.  I noted earlier that for many 
people, constitutional faith is not necessary because they believe the 
regime is fine as it is.  The issue of faith is submerged for people in 
these circumstances.  Yet although it is submerged, it has not neces-
sarily disappeared.  The question of constitutional faith would arise 
again if people began to fear that an adequate constitutional system 
would start to get markedly worse.  Faced with this threat, some 
people might lose faith in the system (placing their trust elsewhere), 
while others would vigorously reassert their faith in order to correct 
the constitutional system and combat the perceived threat.  An exam-
ple is the constitutional rhetoric of the Tea Party.  The Tea Party 
emerged after the victory of Barack Obama in the 2008 election.  Tea 
Partiers were mostly conservative Republicans or conservative inde-
pendents who generally supported the status quo but who had been 
disappointed by the presidency of George W. Bush.67
 
 67. See e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE 
REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM (2012) (noting that the Tea Party is a genera-
tionally bounded variant of long-standing strains of American conservative populism that 
has reshaped the Republican Party); SCOTT RASMUSSEN & DOUG SCHOEN, MAD AS HELL: 
HOW THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT IS FUNDAMENTALLY RESHAPING OUR TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 
  After the elec-
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tion, they suddenly became terrified that Obama would take away 
their constitutional liberties and turn the United States into a secular 
European-style socialist state.  At this point, Tea Partiers began vigo-
rously reasserting their constitutional faith, invoking what Jamal 
Greene describes as narratives of restoration.68
Scott Shapiro argues that an economy of trust and distrust un-
dergirds the practice of interpretation: we understand authors’ choice 
of language in terms of the degree of trust and distrust that one 
should have in subsequent interpreters.
  Whether or not one 
agrees with the Tea Partiers that Obama was a genuine threat to the 
Constitution, his election made salient their latent constitutional 
faith. 
69
We might think of faith as part of a nested opposition between what 
one believes in and what one does not believe in, or between what 
one trusts and distrusts.
  In the same way, we might 
speak of an economy of faith and lack of faith.  The question is not so 
much whether people have faith, but where people place their faith, 
hope, or trust; and equally important, where they place their fears, 
their lack of trust, and their despair. 
70
We can see the distribution of faith in the work of several of the 
contributors to this symposium.  A particularly good example is San-
ford Levinson’s neo-Garrisonianism.  Levinson no longer places his 
faith in the Constitution; rather, he places his faith in the American 
people themselves to create a new Constitution.  To the extent that 
Levinson believes that the Article V process for calling a new constitu-
tional convention is minimally adequate, then he actually retains con-
  What one hopes for and what one fears, 
what one trusts and what one distrusts are often systematically related 
to each other.  One believes in A because one cannot believe in B; 
one puts trust in C because one has been disappointed or betrayed by 
D; one cleaves to E because one is quite certain that F is false or un-
trustworthy, and so on.  Moreover, when we say that a person has lost 
faith in someone or something, we might ask whether what has really 
changed is their distribution of trust and distrust, their personal 
economy of hope and fear. 
 
184–86 (2010) (noting the Tea Party’s disillusionment with George W. Bush’s lack of fiscal 
restraint). 
 68. See Greene, supra note 49, at 981  (“A narrative of restoration urges us to adopt the 
values of the past because the past was a better time and, therefore, has a stronger norma-
tive claim on American identity.”). 
 69. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 331–52 (2011). 
 70.  J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990).  A nested opposition 
is one in which the two opposed terms depend on each other, rely on each other, or turn 
into each other over time.  Id. at 1671, 1676–77. 
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stitutional faith.  It is not faith in the Constitution as a whole, but only 
in those parts that allow us to transition to a new Constitution—along 
with the Preamble, which states the basic purposes of our constitu-
tional enterprise.71
To the extent that Levinson believes that the Article V conven-
tion process is also defective,
   
72 then Levinson is arguing for some-
thing like the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, which was more or less 
illegal under the rules of the then existing Articles of Confederation.  
The Articles were styled as “perpetual,” and Article XIII required un-
animous consent by all the states to any subsequent amendments.73  
The document that emerged from Philadelphia allowed ratification 
by three quarters of the states, and further amendments with less than 
the consent of all of the states.74
Aziz Rana’s political pragmatism may seem to be the very oppo-
site of faith.  “[F]aith in our constitutional tradition,” he explains, 
“has historically embodied one important roadblock to a more tho-
roughgoing redemptive politics.”
  In short, Levinson has not aban-
doned his constitutional faith.  He has simply placed it elsewhere, in 
the American people acting through an Article V constitutional con-
vention, or acting outside the Constitution in a new, technically illeg-
al, convention. 
75  Precisely because “the commit-
ment to constitutional continuity has at key moments undermined 
progressive political principles, we today should be wary of seeing 
constitutionalism as the privileged path to redemption.”76  Instead, 
“the lesson for progressives might be to deemphasize constitutional 
faith and to develop more politically instrumental approaches to the 
value of constitutionalism.”77
Yet Rana’s argument is also premised on an economy of faith, 
and a distribution of trust and distrust. Rana places his faith in the 
possibility of political redemption outside the Constitution.  Moreo-
ver, he has faith that if progressives engage in extra-constitutional pol-
  
 
 71. Cf. Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, supra note 18, at 974 (“[M]y fondest 
hope—which I realize is likely to be unrealized—is that Americans would come to recog-
nize the need for a new constitutional convention.”); id. at 964, 974 (praising the Pream-
ble). 
 72. Cf. id. at 969 (criticizing the Article V amendment process).  If a convention re-
sulted in new amendments, these might have to run the same Article V gauntlet that Le-
vinson criticizes, unless Article V is amended first. 
 73. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. XIII, para. 1. 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. V; id. art. VII. 
 75. Rana, supra note 7, at 1026. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
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itics, their actions will not come back to haunt them.  “[D]espite fears 
of illiberality and unchecked power, self-avowed progressives should 
be much more willing in American political life to challenge constitu-
tional faith and—at times—even to advocate popular discretion and 
legal rupture.”78  Using Reconstruction as an example, Rana argues 
that “extra-legal discretion and federal military imposition, in the 
name of political justice, were essential for the fulfillment of equal 
freedom for all.”79  In these circumstances, “political necessity sug-
gested that, at this moment of historical upheaval, substantive com-
mitments to egalitarian redemption on the one hand and to a dis-
course of constitutionalism on the other were opposed ends—in 
which one could be achieved but not both simultaneously.”80
To be sure, violating the Constitution to achieve political re-
demption might backfire.  Progressives might overreach and, uncon-
strained by legal and constitutional traditions, undermine civil liber-
ties and democracy.  Choosing the wrong moment for extra-legal ac-
tion might lead to backlash and failure, discrediting progressive ambi-
tions for a generation or more.  Finally, reactionary forces might de-
cide to use the very same strategies, making it difficult for progressives 
to complain that their opponents are violating constitutional and 
legal norms that progressives refuse to accept themselves. 
 
Rana is fully aware of these difficulties.  Nevertheless, he argues 
that progressives should be willing to take the risk:  “The lesson is that 
progressives should be less afraid of political discretion and more in-
strumental in their endorsement of constitutional principles and lan-
guages.”81  This is a gamble, and therefore requires a leap of faith.  
“[P]olitical discretion—if exercised on behalf of a broad constituency, 
one able to provide such practices with widespread popular legitima-
cy—has the potential to be both transformative and democratic.”82  
When the political conditions are right, “constituent power may well 
be generative and democratic rather than despotic; at the same time 
constitutionalism and frameworks of constitutional construction can 
simply promote a coercive rule-by-law.”83
These moments are inevitably tragic, Rana explains, because they 
always have unexpected consequences and always create new forms of 
 
 
 78. Id. at 1020. 
 79. Id. at 1043. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1046. 
 82. Id. at 1047. 
 83. Id. at 1048. 
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hierarchy and oppression along with new freedoms.84  But the poten-
tial gains are worth the effort.  “If the goal of progressives is a trans-
formative and ultimately political one,” Rana explains, “faith should 
reside in the ideal of effective and equal freedom alone,” and some-
times this may require a politics of “constitutional rupture” justified 
by broad democratic support.85
Rana’s argument for extra-constitutional democratic discretion is 
premised on a faith that progressives will act appropriately, that they 
will choose the right moment to act, and that reactionary forces will 
not be able to play the same game in a way that destroys progressive 
accomplishments.  In short, Rana may not have faith in the constitu-
tional system, but he clearly has faith in other things.
 
86
B.  Constitutional Faith and Constitutional Dread  
 
Just as faith may undergird legitimacy, so too may the absence of 
faith in any alternative political order.  We can see this point in Ri-
chard Epstein’s response to Sanford Levinson’s call for a new consti-
tutional convention: 
I would fight against this general approach with every fiber 
of my being.  It is not because I think that the current state 
of affairs is ideal, when manifestly it is not.  It is rather that I 
think that any revision of the document will move us dange-
rously along a path of greater and more powerful govern-
ment at the national and state levels that will only make mat-
ters worse. 
    This assessment derives in large measure from Levinson’s 
implicit subtext that he is in favor of a more expansive gov-
ernment, which is at direct odds with my own view that the 
previous expansions of federal power have put burdens 
upon taxpayers that have greatly constricted their liberty. 
    The overall message is this. The convocation of new con-
ventions will introduce a new degree of uncertainty that is 
likely to make matters worse not better.  It is commonly said 
of taxes that old taxes are better than new ones, because 
 
 84. Id. at 1049–50. 
 85. Id. at 1048. 
 86. Rana’s political faith—which elevates the pursuit of justice over constitutional or-
der—is the opposite of Mark Graber’s theory, discussed infra text accompanying notes 90–
101, which chooses constitutional peace over constitutional justice.  
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people can adapt to them.  That is true of constitutions as 
well.87
Epstein believes that the current constitutional regime is very un-
just because it constrains human freedom in so many different ways.  
Therefore it has serious problems of legitimacy.  I am not sure wheth-
er he believes that the current regime is so unjust and offers such lit-
tle hope of improvement that he believes that it is illegitimate. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Epstein believes that a new constitu-
tional convention would lead to an even worse state of affairs.  
Whether or not Epstein thinks that the current system is worthy of re-
spect, he distrusts any alternative that would come from abandoning 
the current Constitution.  Whether or not he has constitutional faith, 
he has constitutional fear; even if he has no constitutional hope, he 
has what I shall call constitutional dread.  Rather than placing his faith 
in the status quo, Epstein places his fear and his distrust in the un-
known.  He would rather work within the (imperfect and unjust) 
Constitution he has than risk a new constitution written by the likes of 
Sanford Levinson.  As Levinson has pointed out, many liberals have a 
symmetrical fear of a new constitutional convention led by Sarah Pa-
lin and members of the Tea Party.88
To be sure, Epstein does not disclaim interest in improving the 
Constitution-in-practice.  He claims to put himself on its side; he of-
fers what he believes are the best accounts of various constitutional 
provisions, including, for example, the Commerce Clause.
  So perhaps many liberals, along 
with their constitutional faith, also have constitutional dread. 
89
In Constitutional Redemption, I note the connections between con-
stitutional faith and constitutional legitimacy for dissenters who be-
lieve that the Constitution-in-practice is very unjust.  Political faith in 
the future allows them to accept the legitimacy of an otherwise defec-
tive political system. Epstein’s example suggests another aspect of po-
  So per-
haps Epstein’s position is not one of pure political fear after all.  Per-
haps he believes that our Constitution can become more libertarian 
over time, and that it is worth trying to convince people that his liber-
tarian interpretations are the best ones. 
 
 87. Richard Epstein, Richard Epstein Responds to Levinson’s Jeffersonian Proposal, LIBERTY 
L. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://libertylawsite.org/post/richard-epstein-responds-to-
levinsons-jeffersonian-proposal/. 
 88. See Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, supra note 18, at 975–76 (noting 
symmetrical fears on the left and right about the possibility of fundamental constitutional 
change). 
 89.  Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 
(1987). 
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litical faith not emphasized in Constitutional Redemption—the connec-
tions between political legitimacy and political dread. 
Some people may accept the current system not because they be-
lieve that it is morally or democratically adequate, but because they 
fear an even worse system will emerge that will have even less legiti-
macy.  These people ground their acceptance of the regime not in 
constitutional faith in a better world but in constitutional dread of a 
worse one. 
Constitutional dread is an inversion of constitutional faith.  A 
person who acts from constitutional dread believes that the current 
system—unjust as it may be—is likely to be better than the alterna-
tives.  Such a person has a kind of constitutional faith.  But what do-
minates their worldview is not hope for a better tomorrow, but fear of 
what change might bring.  This account of political legitimacy—one 
based on dread rather than hope—is closer to Thomas Hobbes than 
to Frederick Douglass. 
Mark Graber’s account of constitutional legitimacy in Dred Scott 
and the Problem of Constitutional Evil90 strikes a middle ground.  It in-
volves a mixture of constitutional dread and constitutional faith.91  
Graber believes that political peace is the most important value to 
preserve in a constitutional system.  It is so important, in fact, that we 
should be willing to sacrifice constitutional justice for constitutional 
peace.92  Social peace is especially valuable because constitutional 
breakdowns may produce great evils—especially as military technolo-
gy makes the prospect of open warfare increasingly deadly.93
 
 90. MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). 
  But 
peace is also valuable because peace holds out the hope of a stable 
 91. It is an interesting accident that the case that best represents constitutional evil for 
many Americans is Dred Scott, and that the plaintiff’s first name, Dred, is a homonym for 
“dread.”  Because Dred Scott is evil—because it reflects a vision of America that was once 
central to our constitutional system but that we do not want to accept as characteristic of 
us—it is something to fear, and therefore something to deny at all costs.  The book’s 
title—Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil—enhances the unconscious linkage 
between the evil of the slaveocracy on the one hand, and fear of our complicity with and 
responsibility for evil on the other.  But Graber draws the opposite conclusion from most 
people: constitutional evil is the result of political bargains and institutional settlements, 
and not necessarily the result of mistaken constitutional interpretation.  Sometimes, con-
stitutional evil is the price we pay for constitutional peace.  Sometimes we must accept con-
stitutional evil because the alternative would be even worse. 
 92. Id. at 5–6 (“[P]resent-day constitutional theorists have an even more pressing duty 
to explore whether constitutional peace should ever be sacrificed in the name of constitu-
tional justice.”). 
 93. See id. at 253–54 (“Adversaries for the remainder of human history will have the 
capacity to inflict catastrophic damage on each other whenever they are unable to resolve 
disputes over justice peaceably.”). 
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politics that can eventually produce a more decent world.94  When we 
become too “obsessed with [constitutional] justice,” Graber argues, 
we will tend to “ignore[] how constitutions function best by creating 
the conditions under which political order can be preserved, enabling 
ordinary politics to be concerned with justice.”95
Graber’s distribution of faith thus turns out to be the opposite of 
Aziz Rana’s. Whereas Rana elevates the pursuit of justice over the pre-
servation of constitutional and legal order, Graber’s political faith 
chooses constitutional peace over a possibly reckless quest for justice. 
 
In his contribution to this symposium, Graber argues that the 
very idea of constitutional redemption depends on the purposes we 
ascribe to the Constitution.96  Looking at the Preamble, we can see 
that justice is only one of these purposes—others include “insur[ing] 
domestic Tranquility” and “provid[ing] for the common defence.” 
Realizing the Constitution’s goals requires attention to these multiple 
values and the important tradeoffs between them.  Hence, Graber ar-
gues, fidelity to the Constitution and belief in its redemption might 
require us to accept constitutional evil if we want to redeem the Con-
stitution’s ability to keep social order, maintain a working politics, and 
forestall foreign threats.97
In fact, Graber points out, it may be far easier to believe in con-
stitutional redemption if we make social order and national security as 
important as justice. People may disagree strenuously about what is 
just and unjust, but they will find it easier to agree whether the state 
has successfully prevented riots and repelled foreign invaders.  More-
over, to continue as a going concern, a state already must secure 
peace and keep its citizens safe from external enemies, but real justice 
might be a distant hope that may never come to pass.
 
98
Graber’s model of constitutional faith is a mixture of faith in the 
Constitution’s ability to maintain social peace (as opposed to justice) 
coupled with constitutional dread at a regime that foolishly under-
mines the possibility of a peaceful politics in the quest for too much 
justice too soon. “Americans,” Graber writes, “do not exercise consti-
 
 
 94.  See  id. at 178 (“The constitutional commitment to maintain union and the social 
peace was both an end in itself and the best way to guarantee the conditions under which 
citizens are most likely to abandon their evil practices.”). 
 95. Id. at 6. 
 96. Mark A. Graber, Redeeming and Living with Evil, 71 MD. L. REV. 1073, 1089–91 
(2012). 
 97. Id. at 1093 (“Efforts to redeem faith in a constitution that ensures domestic tran-
quility are likely to conflict with efforts to redeem faith in a constitution that establishes 
justice.”). 
 98. Id. 
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tutional fidelity when they singlemindedly seek to establish justice at 
the expense of such other constitutional purposes as the common de-
fense and domestic tranquility.”99  Sometimes, he admits, “the consti-
tutional faithful will actively seek to redeem evil,”100 and “accommo-
date and live with those citizens whose practices we find abhorrent”101
Can constitutional dread—as opposed to constitutional hope—
form the basis of constitutional legitimacy?  The liberal principle of 
legitimacy argues that a state is legitimate when all reasonable persons 
would consent to the state’s use of force against them and others.  
Now if a very unjust constitution seems the best that one can do, and 
if one fears that forsaking it would lead to an appreciably worse state 
of affairs, or to the breakdown of social order, then all reasonable 
persons might consent to it, and therefore constitutional dread might 
be a basis for political legitimacy.  This is not the liberalism of hope, 
or even Rawls’s liberalism of reasonable overlapping consensus, but 
the liberalism of dread.  It is a Hobbesian liberalism, which may not 
be very liberal at all, because it may accept a great many restrictions 
on liberty, not to mention equality. 
 
because they believe that is the price of securing other constitutional 
goods.  For Graber, some kinds of constitutional fidelity cannot be ex-
tricated from constitutional dread. 
Thus, this vision of constitutional dread is not the same as Judith 
Shklar’s well-known “liberalism of fear.” Shklar rejected Hobbesian 
authoritarianism and argued that fear of cruelty and evil should drive 
liberals to protect liberty and individual rights.102
Nevertheless, constitutional dread might cause people to put 
themselves on the side of the Constitution-in-practice and defend it 
from those who would seek to change it.  The point of defending the 
Constitution-in-practice, despite its injustices, would not be in the 
hope of ultimate redemption but to hold off an even worse form of 
government. 
  But a Constitution 
that we keep out of fear of something far worse may not even respect 
individual liberty.  Certainly Richard Epstein’s opposition to a new 
constitutional convention does not arise from a belief that the current 
system adequately protects individual freedom.  Rather, he defends 
the current system of government in spite of its (in his view) out-of-
control statism. 
 
 99. Id. at 1095. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21, 21–
38 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). 
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These examples show that some people may cleave to the Consti-
tution out of fear rather than hope.  Nevertheless, it is more likely 
that many people’s views about the Constitution are a complicated 
mixture of political faith and political dread.  People hope that the 
Constitution can be redeemed over time, and they fear abandoning it 
for an uncertain future.  Phrased in this way, we can view constitu-
tional faith and constitutional dread not as contradictory or incom-
patible, but as parts of a larger distribution of faith and distrust that 
may constitute political faith for many people. 
C.  Political Faith and the Problem of Idolatry 
If faith and lack of faith form a nested opposition, then what one 
believes in is often uncannily dependent on things that one does not 
trust. Once these connections are made plain, faith may have to be 
reevaluated.  We see this problem in the Psalmist’s admonition that 
“[i]t is better to trust in the Lord than to put confidence in man.  It is 
better to trust in the Lord than to put confidence in princes.”103
The nested opposition between the work of God and the work of 
human beings brings us to the problem of idolatry.  Monotheism is 
premised on the rejection of idol worship.  Idols are not divine be-
cause they are made by human beings.  One should not worship what 
is made by mortals; it will only mislead and stupefy us.
  
Princes, after all, are only human.  But the problem is, so are the 
members of any organized religion and any church hierarchy.  If be-
lieving in God means believing what one is taught about God by 
priests, rabbis, and ministers, then there is always the danger that one 
is putting one’s faith in human beings, who, through organized (and 
therefore human) religion, present only imperfect, fallible represen-
tations of the divine.  One has to believe that these religious traditions 
are not lying to us about what God is and what He wants.  In this way 
we arrive at a nested opposition: faith in the Lord becomes mediated 
by faith in what it is better not to have faith in. 
104
 
 103. Psalms 118:8–9 (King James) (italics omitted). 
  Yet belief in 
God is generally encountered through participation in a religious 
community, whose members interpret religious beliefs and construct 
religious rituals.  Thus the initial rejection of idolatry in monotheism 
 104. Again, the Pslamist advises us: 
The idols of the heathen are silver and gold, the work of men’s hands. 
They have mouths, but they speak not; eyes have they, but they see not; 
They have ears, but they hear not; neither is there any breath in their mouths. 
They that make them are like unto them: so is every one that trusteth in them. 
Psalms 135:15–18 (King James) (italics omitted). 
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always risks a different form of idolatry—the confusion of the com-
munity’s creations for the divine will. 
Faith in human institutions, or in human projects like the Consti-
tution, cannot be the same as faith in the divine for many different 
reasons.  One reason is the temporal nature of human institutions. 
God is eternal, but human institutions are not.  God does not change 
(although human representations of God can change); He does not 
get better or worse.  But human institutions can improve or decay; 
they can be fulfilled or fall apart.  One reason why it is better to trust 
in the Lord than to trust in princes is that princes can die, become 
corrupt, turn into tyrants, or be overthrown. 
What is true of princes is also true of political constitutions gen-
erally.  They can become corrupt or tyrannical; they can be subverted 
or overthrown.  We know that at some point the Constitution will end.  
Perhaps it will end well, perhaps it will end badly.  But it will not be 
with us forever.  Therefore faith in an institution like the Constitution 
can only be faith for a certain limited time.  Faith in a human institu-
tion is faith that we are at a certain point in the lifecycle of an institu-
tion—nearer to the beginning than the end.  Conversely, faith in an 
institution that can no longer deliver on its promises risks becoming 
its own form of political idolatry. 
All forms of political faith must reckon with the problem of ido-
latry, even if they do not succumb to it.  The way that the problem of 
idolatry arises depends on people’s particular distribution of faith, 
their distinctive economy of trust and distrust. 
For example, Torres and Guinier’s “demosprudence” places faith 
in the ability of ordinary citizens to reshape constitutional meaning 
through direct action that puts pressure on elites for political change.  
This is a faith that ordinary people—especially members of subordi-
nated groups acting through social movements—will be able to force 
elites and existing institutions to listen to them. Moreover, it is a faith 
that ordinary citizens will use their bottom-up popular power to push 
for changes that are actually just.105
Torres and Guinier’s constitutional faith is distributed between 
ordinary citizens, whom they trust, and elites and existing institutions, 
whom they (mostly) do not.  Their faith is also a distribution of faith 
among different types of mobilizations with different political goals.  
For example, Torres and Guinier probably have faith (or at least they 
hope) that certain conservative mobilizations, like the contemporary 
 
 
 105. Torres & Guinier, supra note 44, at 1070 (using the example of the Montgomery 
bus boycott). 
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Tea Party, will not succeed in transforming the Constitution in the 
long run, while popular mobilizations led by subordinated groups ul-
timately will succeed. 
Torres and Guinier’s particular distribution of faith generates 
the distinctive problem of idolatry they must confront.  Even as they 
place faith in ordinary people, they must avoid romanticizing them 
because, as they well understand, ordinary citizens, including the 
most dispossessed members of society, may have illiberal views, may 
not respect the justified rights of others, and may seek to enforce un-
just policies.  Torres and Guinier’s challenge is to place faith in the 
political struggles of ordinary people while recognizing people’s limi-
tations and maintaining a critical perspective.  They must pledge faith 
in popular mobilizations as a vehicle for constitutional change while 
recognizing the dangers and pathologies of popular mobilizations. 
These include not only the dangers and pathologies that arise from 
cooptation of popular movements by elites and incumbent institu-
tions; they also include the dangers and pathologies that result from 
the very success of popular movements for political change. 
Similarly, Rana’s particular distribution of political faith gene-
rates distinctive problems of idolatry.  Rana’s argument for democrat-
ic discretion to go beyond the Constitution creates the danger of ro-
manticizing transgression and revolution as means of escaping the 
Constitution’s limitations.  As Rana understands, revolutions can 
backfire, leading to less democracy and fewer protections for human 
rights, not more;106
Rana deals with the problem of idolatry through his notion of 
the tragic.  Extra-legal constitutional change—like constitutional 
change itself—should always been seen as tragic, because of its un-
avoidable costs, and because of its unavoidable dangers.  “Tragic dis-
course . . . emphasiz[es] the ambiguous nature of any transformative 
project[;]” it requires “political responsibility” and an appreciation of 
“the political stakes when breaking from constitutional fidelity.”
 the French, Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolu-
tions are only the most familiar examples of this phenomenon. 
107
One might think that adopting an attitude of constitutional 
dread avoids the problem of idolatry entirely because constitutional 
dread puts no faith either in the Constitution as it exists or in a future 
constitution that would replace it.  It has no romance either with the 
present or with the future.  But constitutional dread risks a different 
 
 
 106. Rana, supra note 7, at 1047 (“Given the legal specter of Schmittian dictatorship and 
the historical experience of totalitarianism, . . . fears [of extra-constitutional discretion] 
are not to be taken lightly.”). 
 107. Id. at 1051.  
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problem.  By surrendering hope, it risks turning historical contingen-
cy into political necessity.  By treating the status quo as the best we 
can do, it closes the door on the possibility of a better future.  The 
problem is not that political dread confuses existing institutions with 
the divine, but that it risks turning all of the alternative possibilities 
into demons.  That is, constitutional dread turns the unknown into an 
all-powerful evil deity.  If the danger of political hope is naiveté, the 
danger of political fear is the stunting of political imagination.  Con-
stitutional fear risks an unjustified defense of the status quo.  It risks 
the sanctification of the actual—including actual injustices—on the 
ground that this is likely to be the least bad of all possible worlds. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Constitutional Redemption emphasizes the role of faith in the con-
stitutional project.  But, as we have seen, there are few concepts more 
complicated.  First, people do not simply have faith; rather, they have 
a distribution of faith and lack of faith, trust and distrust, that is pro-
jected onto different features of their world.  Changes in circums-
tances that shake their perceptions may subtly alter this economy or 
distribution.  Second, the inversion of political faith, political dread, 
may be as important as faith itself for some members of the political 
community, and what we call “faith” may actually be a complex com-
bination of trust and distrust, hope and fear.  Third, the apparent ab-
sence of political faith may be deceptive; when circumstances change 
suddenly, faith, dread, or some combination of the two may emerge 
powerfully.  Fourth, our political faith is usually part of a nested oppo-
sition—what we believe in and hope for may be uncannily connected 
to what we distrust or fear.  Fifth, political faith always risks political 
idolatry, and, whether we like it or not, the two concepts are deeply 
connected.  Whatever we happen to believe in, and whatever distribu-
tion of political faith and dread, hope, and distrust we hold in our 
hearts, helps create our own distinctive risk of political idolatry.  In 
politics, as in life itself, nothing is more fraught than faith, even as 
nothing is so necessary. 
